Apertura financiera y retos de políticas

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) Hay un descontento creciente con las nociones convencionales sobre la política económica. El lamentable hecho parece ser que un entorno macroeconómico estable puede ser necesario mas no suficiente para obtener los resultados deseados de los sistemas financieros liberalizados. En este trabajo se analizan varias extensiones promisorias del modelo convencional y se tratan sus implicaciones para las políticas.

Is It 1958 or 1968? Three Notes on the Longevity of the Revived Bretton Woods System

This paper examines the durability of what we have elsewhere called the Revived Bretton Woods system. We show that the recent behavior of long-term interest rates is consistent with market expectations that the system will last for a considerable period. We also show that emerging economies with chronic current account surpluses have not experienced the financial crises that many have predicted will trigger the system’s breakdown. Unusually long episodes of current account surpluses and reserve accumulations have been followed by real depreciation and capital gains on reserves, with little or no disruption of economic activity. We argue that, under the original Bretton Woods system, the definition of the balance of payments considered relevant was based on the assumption that collateral, not trust, supports international capital flows. We view the current system as likewise supported by collateral, in the form of goods already produced and delivered to the United States.macroeconomics, 1958, 1968, Longevity, Revived Bretton Woods System

Rescue Packages and Output Losses Following Crises

This paper examines the role of the third party (the IMF) in resolving sovereign default on external debt. We first show that the effects of third party intervention in debt negotiations are quite sensitive to the assumed enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt. The model is then adapted to an insurance crisis. The main result is that the unanticipated component of third party intervention can either intensify or mitigate the dead weight loss following default.

Financial Repression and Capital Mobility: Why Capital Flows and Covered Interest Rate Differentials Fail to Measure Capital Market Integration

Required reserves on banks' deposit liabilities have been utilized by both industrial and developing countries to discourage and sterilize international capital flows. In this paper, we utilize an open economy macro model incorporating bank credit to evaluate this policy. The model suggests that high levels of reserve requirements are a perverse policy tool in that they amplify the effects of foreign monetary shocks, but changes in reserve requirements can insulate a repressed financial market from international financial shocks. The model also suggests that traditional measures of capital mobility such as interest parity conditions or the scale of gross private capital flows are of no value in assessing the openness of repressed financial systems.

Three poems

Three poems by Michael Dooley, an Australian living in the Middle East

Capital flight, external debt, and domestic policies

The international debt crisis of 1982 revealed that unrecorded private capital outflows from developing countries occurred simultaneously with borrowing from international commercial banks. Current interest in capital flight has been generated by the possibility that the resurgence of private capital inflows to these countries may be limited to the return of flight capital. A simple public finance model shows that simultaneous capital outflows and inflows can be explained as the result of private international arbitrage of domestic policies. The paper discusses the welfare consequences of gross two-way capital flows that take advantage of opportunities to avoid taxation or generate subsidy income.Capital movements ; Developing countries ; Finance, Public